Tomorrow we will continue our look at the rise in stolen bases in the majors and ask if the Phillies are prepared to take advantage of the new emphasis on speed on the basepaths.
There was a time in Major League Baseball when stealing bases was a thing. Of course there were the legends; Rickey Henderson, Lou Brock, etc., but there were teams that had multiple guys who not only were capable of stealing bases they did so at abandon. Vince Coleman and Willie McGee with the Cardinals were fun to watch and constantly challenged catchers.
The 1980s and 1990s were a golden era for basestealers. From 1980-1989 there were an average of 3,126 bases stolen per year. In the ’90s that number moved up just slightly to 3,138 stolen bases per year. By the time we all realized the world didn’t end on New Year’s Day of 2000, basestealers started to go out of style and stolen bases between 2000 and 2014 fell to a level around 2,800 per season. Then, the bottom fell out of the stolen base market.
What happened from roughly 2015 into the early 2020s was a perfect storm of incentives pushing teams away from risk on the bases and toward power efficiency. In a word: analytics.
Front offices increasingly leaned on run expectancy and win probability models, and those models were brutal on stolen base attempts unless a runner succeeded at stealing bases at a very high clip. The math showed that if a runner wasn’t converting roughly 75–80 percent of steal attempts, the play actually cost expected runs. Getting caught stealing erased base runners in an era where simply having someone on base carried more value than ever.
As teams became more analytically disciplined, managers stopped giving the green light to average runners. Only elite base stealers kept their freedom. Everyone else was told to stay put and wait for the next swing.
That mindset filtered all the way down into player development. Prospects were trained to value on-base percentage, swing decisions, and power more than pure speed. Steals became a specialized skill instead of a default weapon.
The home run boom of the mid-to-late 2010s reshaped offensive strategy. With juiced balls and optimized swing paths, teams were chasing slugging. When three-run homers are plentiful, the incremental value of stealing second base drops dramatically.
If the next batter is prone to driving the ball into the seats or the gap, risking an out on the bases becomes hard to justify. A walk followed by a homer is more efficient than a steal attempt followed by a single. Analytics reinforced this logic, so offenses skewed toward patience and power rather than motion.
That’s a big reason you see stolen base totals slide steadily from about 2015 through 2019 even before the pandemic distorted the numbers.
Pitchers and catchers got better at controlling the run game
Another under-the-radar factor was improved pitcher mechanics and catcher technology. Pop times dropped across the league as catchers trained specifically for quicker releases and better footwork. Pitchers emphasized quicker deliveries and varied looks, aided by high-speed video and biomechanical feedback.
Analytics helped here too. Teams studied baserunner tendencies, jump timing, and pickoff success rates with precision. Runners weren’t just battling instinct anymore, they were battling data-driven defenses that knew exactly when they were in the right position to steal.
The margins for successful steals got thinner.
Risk management culture crept into dugouts
Analytics didn’t just change numbers on spreadsheets. It changed the emotional culture of decision-making. Managers became more risk-averse because the numbers were always looming. Giving away outs became a cardinal sin. A caught stealing in the seventh inning of a tight game drew far more criticism than a passive inning waiting for a walk or homer.
That conservative tilt flattened running games league-wide, especially for middle-of-the-pack speed players who had been green-lighted freely in the 1980s or 1990s.
The pandemic years masked the bottom
By 2020–2022, you see stolen base totals hit their floor. The shortened 2020 season skews everything, but even in the full seasons afterward, running remained suppressed. Pitchers were dominant, offenses were streaky, and the league hadn’t yet adjusted incentives back toward speed.
It looked like the stolen base was drifting toward novelty status rather than core strategy.
Why 2023 flipped the script
The rule changes directly attacked the factors analytics had optimized against. Bigger bases slightly shortened the distance between bags. Limiting disengagements reduced pitchers’ ability to control runners. The pitch clock prevented excessive holding of runners and kept defenders predictable.
The success rate of steals jumped immediately, pushing the math back into runners’ favor. Once the success rate climbed, analytics flipped sides. Suddenly, stealing bases was efficient again.
Teams didn’t suddenly fall in love with speed again; the numbers told them it made sense.
Tomorrow we will continue our look at the rise in stolen bases in the majors and ask if the Phillies are prepared to take advantage of the new emphasis on speed on the basepaths.
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